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ABSTRACT 
The famed Slaughterhouse Cases were the first cases to 
interpret the Fourteenth Amendment. Those cases arose from a 
Louisiana controversy. This essay suggests that Fourteenth 
Amendment jurisprudence, including Substantive Due Process, is 
rooted in the civilian private law tradition as received in Louisiana 
and as argued by the butchers in the Slaughterhouse Cases. The 
essay explores the civil law roots of the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause, beginning with the Twelve Tables and the Code of 
Justinian. The essay explores how those early codes were 
appreciated by subsequent Louisiana jurists, and how the civil law 
approach became an integral part of subsequent Supreme Court 
rulings involving the Fourteenth Amendment. Throughout this 
process, both the factual matters at issue in the Slaughterhouse 
Cases, and also the philosophical underpinnings that created the 
framework for the butchers’ complaint will be examined. The 
essay uses French and Roman legal texts, as well as Louisiana’s 
own legal history, to show that the Act that established the 
centralized slaughterhouse and stock yards was an affront to the ius 
commune and ius cogens of the era, but that the dissents that agree 
with that interpretation, and not the majority opinion, served as 
precedent in many subsequent Fourteenth Amendment cases. 
Finally, the essay shows that while the civilian approach reached 
its zenith with the Lochner era, it remains relevant, and indeed 
central, to an understanding of modern Substantive Due Process 
case-law.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
If it be said that the civil law and not the common law is the 
basis of the jurisprudence of Louisiana, I answer that the 
decree of Louis XVI, in 1776, abolished all monopolies of 
trades and all special privileges of corporations, guilds, and 
trading companies, and authorized every person to exercise, 
without restraint, his art, trade, or profession, and such has 
been the law of France and of her colonies ever since, and 
that law prevailed in Louisiana at the time of her cession to 
the United States. Since then, notwithstanding the existence 
in that State of the civil law as the basis of her 
jurisprudence, freedom of pursuit has been always 
recognized as the common right of her citizens.1 
There exists among the members of the bar of most states a 
popular though misguided perception of Louisiana and her legal 
customs. Amongst these misconceptions is that while the rest of 
the country developed a common law based upon the Anglo-
American legal tradition, Louisianans continued to adhere to some 
strange legal form known as the Napoleonic Code,2 causing the 
two systems to develop separately and having little bearing upon 
one another.3 In fact, Louisiana’s rich history has contributed a 
great deal to the common-law of the United States. There is 
perhaps no better illustration of this than the civil-rights 
jurisprudence that issued from the Supreme Court following the 
infamous Slaughterhouse Cases.  
 1. Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 105 (1872) (Field, J., dissenting). 
 2. The term “Napoleonic Code” is a common misnomer used by some to 
characterize the source of the Louisiana Civil Code. In fact, the “Code 
Napoléon,” or French Civil Code, was never applied in Louisiana, as it was 
enacted in 1804, after the Louisiana Purchase (1803). When codification took 
place in Louisiana (Digest of 1808), Spanish law was in force. The Digest of 
1808 and the Louisiana Civil Code, which codified Spanish law, borrowed the 
form of the French Civil Code, and its substance wherever it appeared to be 
identical to Spanish law. 
 3. The idea that the Louisiana Civil Code is a simple continuation of the 
Code Napoléon is a misconception. Louisiana had been a Spanish colony for 
several years before its brief cession to Napoleon and subsequent cession to the 
Americans, in 1804. See Symeon Symeonides, An Introduction to “The 
Romanist Tradition of Louisiana”: One Day in the Life of Louisiana Law, 56 
LA. L. REV. 249 (1995).  
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The purpose of this essay is to illustrate three points: that the 
civil law of Louisiana embodies a certain conception of civil rights 
and individual liberties, received from the ius commune and ius 
cogens of its civilian forebears; that the argument undertaken on 
behalf of the butchers in the Slaughterhouse Cases represents that 
conception of privileges and immunities; and that while the 
butchers lost their case, the arguments advanced on their behalf 
have had significant impact on federal civil rights jurisprudence, 
reaching a zenith during the Lochner era.4 In going through this 
process, it is my hope that the reader will gain a greater 
understanding of the evolution of the American conception of 
liberty. I hope that this will in turn raise awareness among 
members of the bar about the degree to which civilian legal 
thought has shaped that evolution. The purpose of this article is not 
to advocate for or against any conception of rights or liberties, 
Lochnerian or otherwise. That intriguing debate has produced a 
great deal of able research already.5  
II. THE CIVILIAN CONCEPTION OF LIBERTY: IUS COGENS, IUS 
COMMUNE 
A. Economic Liberty as a Feature of Ius Cogens, and Ius Cogens 
as a Feature of Domestic Law 
Underlying many codified legal systems are the concepts of ius 
cogens and ius commune. Ius cogens may be best translated as 
peremptory norms, so normative as to be not susceptible to 
derogation.6 Although the term is generally thought to apply to the 
 4. The term “Lochner era” refers to a period during which substantive due 
process jurisprudence was characterized by an emphasis on economic rights, 
such as liberty of contract. The era is so named because of the landmark 
decision in Lochner v. New York, infra note 124, which typified the period. The 
Lochner era will be discussed in greater detail in a later section. 
 5. See, e.g., DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING 
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM (Univ. of Chicago Press 
2011). 
 6. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331: 
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sphere of international law, is more correctly understood as a 
secular, civilian iteration of natural law.7 Although the subject of 
this paper is not specifically international, the law as received in 
Louisiana is the product of many centuries of dialogue between the 
nations who had adopted and refined a codified system of law, and 
those early Romanist thinkers and jurists from whom that law was 
received. The development of these civilian jurisdictions must 
therefore reflect the character of those several nations involved in 
these epochal dialogues. Louisiana was first the colony of a distant 
kingdom and, as a result, its jurisprudence is steeped in a tradition 
of international dealing. Specifically, the colony of Louisiana dealt 
extensively with its colonial masters in France and Spain 
respectively, but also with its common-law neighbor, the United 
States. Until the southern part of Louisiana became a territory 
(Territory of Orleans) and then finally a state (Louisiana), relations 
between Louisiana and her neighbors and various colonizers were 
necessarily international in nature. In order to have a peremptory 
norm as understood in the international context, that norm must be 
viewed as not susceptible to derogation in each individual country. 
Ius cogens can only apply internationally so long as each of the 
several countries upon whom it is to apply share a normative sense 
of the importance of the rights enshrined. For this reason there is 
no logic to barring ius cogens from the lexicon of the domestic 
civilian jurist.  
With that in mind, our first task is to discern the nature of the 
civilian conception of liberty and rights. Noted contemporary 
For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of 
general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the 
international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no 
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a 
subsequent norm of general international law having the same 
character.  
 7. James S. Gifford, Jus Cogens Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or 
Immunities, 16 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 481, 485 (1999) (arguing that jus 
cogens is “essentially a secular articulation of natural law”).  
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French intellectual Alexandre Kojève posits that human 
phenomenon generally, and droit specifically, arose from 
anthropogenic desires and the acts that accomplished the aim of 
those desires.8 Kojève states that this process is expressed as either 
war or economics. The duality is the result of the “risk of the 
master in the struggle [on the one hand] and on the other hand, the 
work of the slave which results from it.”9 To Kojève, justice as 
achieved by droit is a human phenomenon, and in order for a 
human to be fully realized, he must be a citizen who is neither a 
slave nor a master, “being one and the other simultaneously.”10 
Through this discussion, we begin to see that the idea of liberty of 
labor, as expressed through work, is inseparable from a certain 
conception of the free citizen. To Kojève, a man who has no 
freedom of labor cannot be a fully realized human being and is 
therefore denied his humanity per se.11 Personal and economic 
liberty are therefore features of a legal system that cannot be 
abrogated if the system is to retain its legitimacy. Although 
Kojève’s analysis is more recent, echoes of those same concerns 
are seen in many early civilian texts. 
That certain rights of a man are not susceptible to derogation as 
a proper function of legitimate law is a known feature of ius 
cogens. By applying Kojève’s conception of the actualized human, 
 8. ALEXANDRE KOJÈVE, OUTLINE OF A PHENOMENOLOGY OF RIGHT 215 
(Bryan-Paul Frost ed., Bryan-Paul Frost & Robert Howse trans., 2000) (dialectic 
concerning the source of droit) (“In other words, all human phenomena have as 
their basis War and Economics, based upon Work. It is economics and war 
which constitute the actuality of human reality, of the historical existence of 
humanity”). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 216 (“And if he is man, and not animal, as warrior, worker, or 
citizen, it is not only as such that he is so. He is just as human as a ‘religious 
subject’ or a ‘moral subject’ and so on, or finally as a ‘subject of droit’”).  
 11. See id. at 231: 
Just as the Slave can only free himself by synthesizing mastery with his 
servitude, his Droit can only be actualized by being synthesized with 
the Droit of his master. And just as the freed slave (by resumption of 
the struggle and an acceptance of the risk) is neither Master or Slave, 
but Citizen, actualized slavish Droit is neither slavish nor aristocratic: it 
is the synthetic Droit of the Citizen based upon the Justice of equity. 
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we are shown that the nature of those fundamental rights requires 
that freedom of labor run to the citizens governed by valid law. In 
the French legal tradition, liberty and equality are both necessary 
to the proper operation of justice. It is the emphasis on equality 
that requires a high degree of economic liberty, as liberty and 
equality are seen as inseparable features of a just legal system.12 
Indeed, amongst the French, whose Civil Code served as the model 
for the Louisiana Civil Code, inequality is an “infringement” of 
common rights that results from unjust distinctions between the 
rich and poor.13 In the French tradition, the absence of privileges 
granted to a given caste is an imperative feature of a just civilian 
society and was a feature of the ius cogens which formed the 
opinions of the early Louisiana codifiers. 
B. Ius Commune, Private Law, and the Presumptions of the 
Louisiana Civil Code 
 As rights and liberties belong to people, codification of private 
law places people on equal footing with respect to those rights. 
These rights, connected to peremptory norms within the ius 
cogens, are given force within the ius commune by way of the 
codified private law. That private law should be seen as a 
protection for the equal status of all citizens subject to the ius 
commune was so central to early French codifiers that in the case 
of the Code Napoléon, the general grant of rights to all French 
citizens falls under Title I, Chapter I.14 That the recognition of civil 
rights as a birthright for all Frenchmen precedes a code that is 
largely concerned with how those citizens structure their dealings 
under private law is relevant in two ways. Structurally, the 
 12. ALFRED FOUILLÉE ET AL., Vol.VII MODERN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY SERIES: 
MODERN FRENCH LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 37 (Committee of the Association of 
American Law Schools ed., Franklin W. Scott & Joseph P. Camberlain trans., 
1916) (“Yet for the French this is only the first foundation-stone of law; they do 
not comprehend liberty apart from equality. . . .”).  
 13. Id. (“To the French, what is inequality, if not privilege for one man and 
servitude for another, and consequently a lack of liberty?”).  
 14. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.], Title 1, chapter 1 (Fr.). 
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placement of these provisions reveals that the codifiers intended to 
place civil rights at the fore of any discussion of private law. 
Substantively, the Code Napoléon was promulgated in order to 
cement the legitimacy of the law.15 By placing these rights so 
prominently, the codifiers put the people of France on notice that 
the rights so enshrined should be expected and respected in their 
private dealings, allowing the citizen to take an individualized 
possession of, and responsibility for, his own rights. The 
promulgation of these early codes served to place all French 
citizens on equal footing with respect to the exercise of their rights, 
and in so doing secured those rights from abuse. An individualized 
realization of the protection of economic liberty is necessary to 
ensure the citizens’ sense of security in their economic rights.16 
Security is necessary to the development of wealth and democratic 
character, and that security is in turn protected as a function of the 
private law within the ius commune.17 The ius commune as 
expressed in the civil code, running from the Twelve Tables, 
through France and Spain, and ultimately to Louisiana, acts to 
promulgate these private rights, and serves to publicize the fact 
that each citizen has been put on equivalent footing with respect to 
rights against third parties.18  
C. The Civil Law as Received in Louisiana 
In 1806, the Louisiana Territorial Legislature attempted to pass 
an Act declaring the continued applicability of the civilian 
authorities, until such time as “the Legislature may form a civil 
 15. Id. at art. 1. 
 16. FOUILLÉE ET AL., supra note 12, at 420 (“neither wealth nor character 
can develop where the feeling of [moral and economic] security do not exist”). 
 17. Id. at 423–25 (discussing the features of private law “necessary to 
assure the validity of a right as against a third person”). 
 18. See, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, Of Promulgation of the Laws and 
Promulgation of the Reasons Thereof, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM, 
PUBLISHED UNDER THE SUPERINTENDENCE OF HIS EXECUTOR, JOHN BOWRING 
157, 157–58 (Simpkin, Marshal & Co. 1893) (discussing the importance of 
promulgating law in order to teach men how to live together without causing 
one another injury).  
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code for the territory.”19 The Act to Preserve the Civil Law was a 
direct rebuke to the American President, Thomas Jefferson, who 
had installed Governor C.C. Claiborne with direct instructions to 
implement the common law.20 Although this Act was eventually 
repealed, it is useful as it specifies the authorities and customs that 
formed the Louisiana ius commune. Among those authorities 
mentioned explicitly within this Act were: (1) the “Roman Civil 
Code [sic], as being the foundation of the Spanish law,” described 
as being composed of the Code of Justinian, the work of the 
commentators and particularly Domat’s treatise on the civil law; 
(2) the Spanish law, consisting of recompilations and books listed 
in the Act.21 Louisianans of the period feared that the common 
law’s instability would result in a usurpation of property rights.22 
The Act to Preserve the Civil Law was born out of a fear of the 
perceived uncertainty of the common law, and offers insight into 
precisely what civil law was received by the people of Louisiana.23 
The Corpus Iuris Civilis and the Twelve Tables upon which it was 
built, do describe a conception of the privileges and immunities 
 19. An Act declaring the laws which continue to be in force in the Territory 
of Orleans, and authors which may be recurred to as authorities within the same 
(1806), reprinted in 1 LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE at xxv (A.N. Yiannopolous ed., 
2013) [hereinafter “The Act to Preserve the Civil Law” or “this Act”).  
 20. Edward F. Haas, Louisiana’s Legal Heritage: An Introduction, to 
LOUISIANA’S LEGAL HERITAGE 3 (Edward F. Haas ed., Perdido Bay Press 1983) 
(describing Gov. Claiborne and Pres. Jefferson’s stated goal as “assimilation” of 
the Louisiana Territory). 
 21. See The Act to Preserve the Civil Law, supra note 19, at 6.  
 22. The Act to Preserve the Civil Law was passed by the House of 
Representatives and the Legislative Council, but was vetoed by Governor 
William C.C. Claiborne. John A. Lovett, On the Principle of Legal Certainty in 
the Louisiana Civil Law Tradition: From the Manifesto to the Great Repealing 
Act and Beyond, 63 LA. L. REV. 1397, 1403 (2003).  
 23. See id. at 1408: 
Because the authors of the Manifesto linked the survival of their land 
titles, and their closely interrelated property rights in the slaves who 
exploited those lands, to the survival of pre-cession Spanish (and 
French) law governing those property rights, it is hardly surprising that 
the Manifesto spoke with such intensity about the consequences of 
‘overthrowing received [civil law].’ 
(quoting 9 THE TERRITORIAL PAPERS OF THE UNITED STATES: THE TERRITORY 
OF ORLEANS 1803-1812 652–53 (Clarence E. Carter ed., U.S. Gov’t Printing 
Office 1940)). 
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afforded to a Roman of that period. That conception is rooted in 
the language of equality before the law. Using characteristically 
direct language, Law I of Table IX tells us that in ancient Rome, 
“[N]o privileges, or statutes, shall be enacted in favor of private 
persons, to the injury of others, contrary to the law common to all 
citizens, and which all individuals, no matter of what rank, have a 
right to use.”24 The civilian tradition of enshrining those rights as a 
function of private law seems to have origins in the Roman 
characterization of law as being either public or private. It borders 
on the tautological to point out that in order for a right to run to an 
individual, it must have an individualized expression. Under the 
Roman approach, this could only be accomplished through the use 
of private law, as public law was only concerned with the welfare 
of the state.25  
This fundamental truth would have been understood by the 
drafters of the Code Napoléon and the subsequent Digest of the 
Civil Laws drafted by attorneys Louis Casimir Moreau Lislet and 
John Brown.26 Whether the drafters of the “Old Code” (as the 
Digest was later called) intended to adopt a French or Spanish 
conception of the ius commune was the topic of a rollicking 
academic debate between two noted professors of law at Tulane 
University and Louisiana State University.27 Professor Robert 
Pascal of Louisiana State University, and Professor Rodolfo Batiza 
 24. SAMUEL PARSONS SCOTT, THE CIVIL LAW 73 (AMS Press 1973). 
 25. See J. INST. 1.1.4 (INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN (John Baron Moyle trans., 
Oxford Univ. Press, 7th prtg. 1967)): 
The study of law consists of two branches, law public, and law private. 
The former relates to the welfare of the Roman State; the latter to the 
advantage of the individual citizen. Of private law then we may say that 
it is of threefold origin, being collected from the precepts of nature, 
from those of the law of nations, or from those of the civil law of 
Rome. 
 26. See Haas, supra note 20, at 4 (stating that the Digest of 1808 was 
divided into three books dealing separately with persons, with estates and things, 
and with the acquisition of property, and describing the code’s drafters). 
 27. See A.N. Yiannopoulos, Early Sources of Louisiana Law: Critical 
Appraisal of a Controversy, in LOUISIANA’S LEGAL HERITAGE, supra note 20, at 
87. 
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of Tulane University locked horns in 1972, with Professor Batiza 
arguing that the sources of the Louisiana Code were largely 
French;28 both Professors contributed a great deal to the literature 
on this matter. Some within the academy did concur with Professor 
Batiza’s approach for a time.29 More recently, the view that the 
Louisiana Civil Code was inspired primarily by French law has 
faded from prominence as a result of further research and 
discovery.30 Either approach is sufficient to establish that the 
drafters, and the Louisiana Digest of 1808, were rooted in the 
civilian notion of private law. The fact that the Digest is not 
illustrative of the French revolutionary ideas did not prevent 
French legal culture from being pervasive in Louisiana: the French 
notion of liberty through equality under the law would later 
prosper in doctrinal and court arguments.  
D. The Constitution & Civil Code of Louisiana, circa 1870 
Confusion about which earlier laws were to survive, as only 
those contradicted by the Digest had been abrogated, made clear 
the need for Louisiana’s Digest to be re-codified.31 The redactors 
included Lislet, Edward Livingston, and others, who went about 
the task of crafting a coherent and complete civil code, this time 
 28. Id. at 98 (citing Batiza for the proposition that 70% of the provisions of 
the Louisiana Civil code of 1808 were derived from the Projet du Gouvernement 
and the Code Napoléon, and another 15% was Spanish and Roman and doctrinal 
works) (“Thus 1,837 of 2,160 articles (or about 85% of the whole) were derived 
from French sources while most of the remaining sources were derived from 
Spanish sources”) (internal quotes omitted). 
 29. Id. at 101–2. 
 30. See Olivier Moréteau, De Revolutionibus: The Place of the Civil Code 
in Louisiana and in the Legal Universe, 5 J. CIV. L. STUD. 31, 37 (2012) 
(discussing the evidence that the substance of the Louisiana Civil Code was not 
derived primarily from French law); see also Thomas J. Semmes, History of the 
Laws of Louisiana and of the Civil Law, 5 J. CIV. L. STUD. 313 (2012) (first 
published as a book in 1873; Semmes discusses the largely-Spanish sources for 
the Louisiana Civil Code). 
 31. See A.N. Yiannopoloulos, The Civil Codes of Louisiana, 1 CIV. L. 
COMMENT. 1, 11 (2008) (citing Cottin v. Cottin, 5 Mart.(o.s.) 93 (La. 1817) as 
representative of the problems that had thrown the system into an unworkable 
state of tumult).  
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abrogating the ancient laws on points addressed in the code.32 
Many of those involved with the re-codification were in fact the 
same individuals who had clashed with President Jefferson over 
the original Act. Although the code was distinctly Louisianan, in 
that Roman and Spanish sources were used, these drafters brought 
a distinctly French conception of the civil law to their task, 
allowing us to infer the continued application of the principles 
discussed supra,33 in doctrinal and court arguments. The Code was 
revised yet again after the Civil War. The Code of 1870 is largely 
the same as the Code of 1825, but for the removal of those parts 
dealing with slavery and the incorporation of other statutes passed 
subsequent to the 1825 Code.34 This Code of 1870 is, in turn, 
applicable to the facts of the Slaughterhouse Cases. 
E. Public and Private Law as Expressed in the Louisiana 
Constitution 
 Economic rights do not appear in any of the many revisions of 
Louisiana’s Constitution until the most recent iteration, which was 
adopted in 1974.35 The statement of economic rights appears in the 
preamble, which is an addition to the otherwise-similar preamble 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 12: 
The redactors of the 1825 Code followed the French Civil Code closely 
and relied heavily on French doctrine and jurisprudence . . . . They 
drew freely from the treatises of Domat, Pothier, and Toullier, but, at 
the same time, paid attention to the Digest of Justinian, the Siete 
Partidas, Febrero, and other Spanish materials. Even so, the Code of 
1825 contains for the most part provisions that have an exact equivalent 
in the French Civil Code. 
 34. Id. at 14: 
The Civil Code of 1870 is substantially the Code of 1825. The changes 
made relate merely to the elimination of provisions concerning slavery, 
the incorporation of amendments made since 1825, and the integration 
of acts passed since 1825, which dealt with matters regulated in the 
Code without officially amending it. These changes necessitated 
renumbering the articles of the Code, but they did not affect its 
structure, underlying theory, or the substance of most of its provisions. 
 35. LA. CONST. pmbl. (“We, the people of Louisiana, grateful to Almighty 
God for the civil, political, economic, and religious liberties we enjoy. . . .”). 
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to the Louisiana Constitution of 1921.36 Instead, the early 
constitutions appear to have followed the Justinian approach, 
treating the constitution as an instrument of public law and 
eschewing any mention of private rights or liberties.37 The marked 
shift in approach coincides with the end of the Civil War and the 
beginning of the Radical Republican and carpetbagger38 rule, 
which held sway over the State of Louisiana during the early 
reconstruction period.39 With the influx of carpetbaggers and with 
minority suffrage militarily ensured, the Louisiana Constitution of 
1868 reflects the Radical Republican ideals and echoes language 
found in the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.40 This 1868 document sees the first use of the 
Louisiana Constitution to enumerate individual rights and liberties, 
thereby blurring the once neat distinction between public and 
private law.41 Even though Louisiana had been weakened by a 
civil war and subjected to the importation of northern political 
actors, only some of the assimilation intended by Thomas Jefferson 
nearly seventy years prior was possible. It is a testament to the 
depth of the civil law importance to the Louisianans of the day that 
 36. LA. CONST. pmbl. (repealed 1972) (“We, the people of Louisiana, 
grateful to Almighty God for the civil, political, and religious liberties we 
enjoy….”).  
 37. See, e.g., LA. CONST. pmbl. (repealed 1861) (“We the people of 
Louisiana, do ordain and establish this Constitution”). 
 38. “Carpetbagger” is a derogatory term used by Southerners for those 
Northerners who moved south after the Civil War. They were viewed as 
outsiders and opportunists in search of personal financial gain at the expense of 
the local population. 
 39. See e.g., LEE HARGRAVE, THE LOUISIANA STATE CONSTITUTION 11–12 
(Oxford Univ. Press 2011). The post-Civil War Reconstruction period in the 
former Confederate (southern) states lasted from 1863-1877. By 1876, only 
three of the eleven states subject to Reconstruction were still occupied by the 
federal military: Florida, Louisiana, and South Carolina; see ERIC FONER, 
RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–1877 (Harper & 
Row 1988).  
 40. LA. CONST. Title I Art. 3 (repealed 1879) (“There shall be neither 
slavery nor involuntary servitude in this state, otherwise than for the punishment 
of a crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted”). 
 41. LA. CONST. pmbl. (repealed 1879) (“We the people of Louisiana, in 
order to establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, promote the general 
welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity. . . .”). 
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the civilian distinction between public and private law persisted as 
long as it did. It follows that, because the constitutions drafted 
under self-rule reflect the Roman distinction between public and 
private law, those pre-war instruments were a more true reflection 
of the civilian approach and, as a result, they are a more accurate 
reflection of the deeply held convictions of butchers of the era and 
their lawyers. 
To those tradesmen and their attorneys, the right of self 
directed labor and economic liberty was so rooted in the civil law, 
and eventually in the Louisiana Civil Code, that there was no need 
to specify that right, as any act in contravention of those liberties 
would be repugnant to legitimate governance, and in derogation of 
the ius cogens and ius commune. There was no bill of rights in the 
original Louisiana Constitutions, not because the civilians had not 
considered rights at all, but because their approach was 
fundamentally different. A bill of rights was familiar to common 
law jurisdictions and would have been familiar to jurists in 
Louisiana. That such an enumeration was absent from the 
Louisiana Constitution until its addition by a reconstruction 
government, shows that is was previously omitted by choice; a fact 
that further supports the contention that the Civil Code, while 
private in nature, was intended to secure the liberties of the 
governed by way of equality before the law.  
At this stage, it bears explicitly mentioning that thus far we 
have followed a clearly delineated path from the Twelve Tables 
and the Corpus Iuris Civilis, the foundational texts of civilian 
jurisprudence, to the French civil law, and now to the Louisiana 
law and custom, which would have been the custom and law 
governing those involved in the Slaughterhouse litigation. 
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III. THE SLAUGHTERHOUSE CASES 
A. Historical Context: A Brief Detour through Corruption, a 
Monopoly and Reconstruction Politics  
On March 8, 1869 the Louisiana legislature passed a bill 
prohibiting the slaughter of livestock within what are now known 
as Orleans, Jefferson, and St. Bernard Parishes.42 The ability to 
maintain livestock and butchering facilities was instead assigned to 
the seventeen-person Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and 
Slaughter-House Company.43 The Act, entitled “An act to protect 
the health of the city of New Orleans, to locate the stock landings 
and slaughter-houses and to incorporate the Crescent City Live-
Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Company” served to divest 
over 1000 local butchers and related workmen from their 
livelihoods.44 While slaughtering operations in New Orleans had at 
one time been limited to a spit of land, now known as Algiers, on 
the opposite bank of the Mississippi river, the practice of 
boucherie spread quickly as the city grew.45 This fast, unrestricted 
growth in a manifestly unsanitary trade led to some obvious risks 
and waste disposal issues. So acute was this problem, that not only 
was slaughtering sometimes done in the city streets, but improperly 
discarded livestock waste and butchering offal was left to fester in 
the streets and on the banks of the river.46 The descriptions of 
those present at the time are predictable but shocking, as they 
describe a situation so putrid and unhealthy as to be unimaginable 
 42. JULIUS J. MARKE, VIGNETTES OF LEGAL HISTORY 170 (Fred B. Rothman 
& Co. 1965). 
 43. Referred to hereinafter as “the Company.” 
 44. Act of Mar. 8, 1869, No. 117, 1869 La. Acts 170 [hereinafter “the 
Act”]; MARKE, supra note 42, at 170. 
 45. RONALD M. LABBÉ & JONATHAN LURIE, THE SLAUGHTERHOUSE CASES: 
REGULATION, RECONSTRUCTION, AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 38 (Univ. 
Press of Kansas 2003) (“Early in the century, slaughtering in New Orleans had 
been confined to a small area located directly across the Mississippi from the 
city and known as ‘Slaughterhouse Point’”).  
 46. Id. at 40. 
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and ultimately raising the question: why was the Act so 
vociferously opposed?47  
1. Bribery 
The Slaughterhouse Act was not a new endeavor. The idea that 
the city ought to return to a centralized butcher model had been 
brought before the legislature, and was rejected and derided. The 
butchers had become a genuine political force, both organized and 
numerous.48 To that end, it was difficult to pass effective 
regulation. Soon after the passage of the Act, it became clear that 
the various political roadblocks to regulatory reform had been 
cleared by the use of a well-established tactic: bribery. The 
legislators responsible for the passage of the Act had been given 
the opportunity to buy significant stock holdings in the new 
monopoly.49 That pecuniary interest was sufficient to secure the 
passage of the Act. The question of the validity of an Act secured 
through bribery was central to the butcher’s arguments at the state 
level.50 Although the butchers argued that the Act was the result of 
a conspiracy to enrich private citizens, secured through deceit, 
fraud and bribery, an unfriendly Louisiana bench refused to rule on 
that issue.51 The butchers argued that as “an act for the emolument 
 47. Id. at 61: 
The amount of filth thrown into the river above the source from which 
the city is supplied water, and coming from the slaughterhouses, is 
incredible. Barrels filled with entrails, livers, blood, urine, dung, and 
other refuse portions in an advanced stage of decomposition, are 
constantly being thrown into the river, but a short distance from the 
banks, poisoning the air with offensive smells and necessarily 
contaminating the water near the banks for miles. 
(quoting testimony of a health officer of the third district, Louisiana House of 
Representatives Special Committee on the Removal of the Slaughterhouses, 
Minute Book (1867)). 
 48. Id. at 40–41 (discussing the butchers’ considerable political influence, 
and explaining this as the cause for why reform failed). 
 49. MARKE, supra note 42, at 170. 
 50. See, e.g., State ex rel. Belden v. Fagan, 22 La. Ann. 545, 547–48 (La. 
1870).  
 51. Id. 
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of private individuals,” the Act was a private statute.52 As the 
Court saw it, the Act was a valid exercise of police powers, and as 
such was a matter of public law, not private, as the butcher’s had 
urged.53 While there have been attempts by some more recent 
scholars to rescue the reputation of the legislators and the Courts 
who ruled that the exclusion of the evidence was proper, bribery in 
the legislature generally, and with respect to the Act specifically, 
was common knowledge at the time.54  
2. “[A] monopoly of a very odious character”55 
The public resentment generated by the Act also grew from the 
nature of the power granted to the Company. Because the 
monopoly was seen as a benefit granted to a cabal of corrupt 
profiteers, and secured through graft, the monopoly lacked the 
intrinsic fairness apparent in other exceptions to the rules against 
monopolies.56 Justice Bradley, riding circuit in Louisiana at the 
time, wrote in his decision that it seemed difficult “to conceive of a 
more flagrant case of violation of the fundamental rights of labor 
than” the monopoly granted to the Company.57 This “odious”58 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Herbert Hovenkamp, Technology, Politics, and Regulated Monopoly: 
An American Historical Perspective, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1263, 1306 (1984) 
(describing the evidence of bribery as the result of southern obsession with 
corruption and as having little evidentiary basis) contra LABBÉ & LURIE, supra 
note 45, at 97–99 (citing litigation records of the stockholders in the company 
for numerous clear examples of specific occasions of bribery connected to the 
passage of the Act).  
 55. Live-Stock Dealer’s & Butcher’s Ass’n v. Crescent City Live-Stock 
Landing & Slaughter-House Co., 15 F.Cas. 649, 652 (C.C.D. La. 1870) rev’d 
sub nom. Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872). 
 56. Michael Conant, Anti-Monopoly Tradition Under the Ninth and 
Fourteenth Amendments: Slaughter-House Cases Re-Examined, 31 EMORY L.J. 
785, 823–24 (1982) (discussing Live-Stock Dealer’s Ass’n, 15 F.Cas. 649 
(1870)).  
 57. Live-Stock Dealer’s Ass’n, 15 F.Cas. at 653: 
So far as the act of the legislature of Louisiana is a police regulation, it 
is, of course, entirely within its power to enact it. It is claimed to be 
nothing more. But this pretense is too bald for a moment's 
consideration. It certainly does confer on the defendant corporation a 
monopoly of a very odious character. . . . But it is not sufficient to 
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monopoly would have been seen as especially egregious to citizens 
in a civil law jurisdiction, where the preferential treatment granted 
to the members of certain social castes resulted in the strong 
protection of those rights within the ambit of private law.  
In a brief submitted to the United States Supreme Court, lead 
attorney for the butchers, John Campbell argues this same point.59 
Citing Thierry and De Tocqueville, Campbell points out that it was 
precisely the eradication of preferential privileges in labor that was 
credited with the rise, and indeed the very existence, of civil liberty 
for all.60 Campbell’s brief makes clear that the monopoly granted 
to the company was a privilege that was expressly forbidden in the 
French civil law as received by Louisianans a generation earlier.61 
The brief casts the monopoly as offensive to French and 
international history and human nature, arguing that what is now 
called ius cogens forbade unlawful servitude and restriction on the 
free practice of labor, and that the Constitution of the United States 
had adopted this peremptory norm through the ratification of the 
show that it is a monopoly and void at common law, for the legislature 
may alter the common law, and may establish a monopoly, unless that 
monopoly be one which contravenes the fundamental rights of the 
citizen protected by the constitution. . . . [T]he fourteenth amendment 
of the constitution was intended to protect the citizens of the United 
States in some fundamental privileges and immunities of an absolute 
and not merely of a relative character. And it seems to us that it would 
be difficult to conceive of a more flagrant case of violation of the 
fundamental rights of labor than the one before us. 
 58. Id.  
 59. Plaintiffs’ Brief upon the Re-argument at 5 Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 
U.S. 36 (1872) (Nos. 470, 476, 480), 1872 WL 15118. 
 60. Id. (tracing unjust labor privileges from ancient times to banalités 
(payments from peasants to lords) paid to the French lords, and the eradication 
of banalité by the French legislative assembly in 1791): 
These rights of Banalite (sic) were all suppressed in the 23d section of 
the decree of 1791 of the legislative assembly. It declares that all rights 
of Banalite (sic) of the oven, mill, winepress, slaughter house, forge, 
and the like, whether founded on custom, prescription, or recognized by 
judicial sentence, should be abolished without indemnity. Historical 
writers attribute to this legislature,(sic) the suppression of castes in 
France, and the existence of civil liberty for all.  
 61. Id. 
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Thirteenth Amendment.62 In an earlier supplemental brief to the 
Supreme Court, Campbell points out that much like the ius cogens, 
the assumptions that a worker could not be deprived of a right to 
apply their labor or craft to their own benefit “were recognized in 
the American customs and habitudes, and were assumed as valid in 
written law and judicial decisions, and in all the intercourse of 
society.”63  
Campbell uses that historical background to argue that the 
monopoly granted to the Company was an affront to the butchers 
and was no different than the hated banalité, or the involuntary 
servitude, prohibited under the Thirteenth Amendment.64 Although 
there is a clear irony, as detailed below, in Campbell making these 
arguments, they do indeed reflect an understanding of the 
Louisianan civilian tradition. This is evidenced by the swift repeal 
of all monopolies in Louisiana, including the Company’s 
monopoly, by the new Louisiana Constitution of 1879.65 This new 
Louisiana Constitution passed as the reconstruction influence in 
the south dwindled, allowing the civilian impulse to again assert 
itself. Notably, the Company sued the State, and again found itself 
in front of Justice Miller’s Supreme Court.66 There, the Company 
argued that articles 248 and 258 of the new Constitution of 
 62. Id. at 6–8. 
 63. Supplemental Brief and Points of Plaintiffs in Error at 3 Slaughterhouse 
Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872), 1871 WL 14607. 
 64. Plaintiffs Brief upon the Re-argument, supra note 59, at 8–9. 
 65. See LA. CONST. art. 248 (repealed 1898): 
The police juries of the several parishes, and the constituted authorities 
of all incorporated municipalities of the state, shall alone have the 
power of regulating the slaughtering of cattle and other live-stock 
within their respective limits: Provided, no monopoly or exclusive 
privilege shall exist in this state, nor such business be restricted to the 
land or houses of any individual or corporation: provided, the 
ordinances designating places for slaughtering shall obtain the 
concurrent approval of the board of health or other sanitary 
organization.  
See also LA. CONST. art. 258 (repealed 1898) (“[T]he monopoly features in the 
charter of any corporation now existing in the state, save such as may be 
contained in the charters of railroad companies, are hereby abolished”). 
 66. Butchers’ Union Slaughter-House & Live-Stock Landing Co., v. 
Crescent City Live-stock & Slaughter-House Co., 111 U.S. 746 (1884). 
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Louisiana were void as an impermissible infringement of their 
contract with an earlier legislature.67 In that case, Justice Miller, 
again writing for the majority, deferred to the State and allowed the 
articles in question to stand.68  
3. The Politics of Reconstruction: Attorneys and Justices in the 
Slaughterhouse Cases  
All of the foregoing discussion appears to be a principled 
debate over sound legal principles. Had the Slaughterhouse Cases 
arisen in a vacuum, this certainly would have been the case. 
Instead, the litigation arose while the dust of the American Civil 
War still hung in the air. The case featured some of the keenest and 
most influential legal minds of the day. Even more than today, the 
bar of the reconstruction era was an exclusive guild, and, 
especially at such a high level, its members could be expected to 
have interacted frequently. In the years surrounding the Civil War, 
this familiarity understandably bred some personal acrimony 
among the members of the bar. These pre-eminent legal minds 
were quick to involve themselves in the cause not out of a sincere 
interest in the appropriate setting for live-stock slaughter, but out 
of deep and divisive disagreements about the role of the federal 
government in the Deep South following the Civil War.  
The chief attorney for the butchers, John Campbell, was a son 
of the South and had served as a United States Supreme Court 
Justice for several years before resigning upon Alabama’s 
secession from the Union.69 After a return to the practice of law in 
his adopted home of New Orleans, Campbell became 
disenchanted, even bitter, at the state of affairs in the 
 67. Id. at 749–50 (discussing the Company’s argument that the Louisiana 
Constitution of 1879 included articles that were an impermissible infringement 
of a contractual obligation under U.S. CONST. Art. 1 § 10). 
 68. Id. at 754. 
 69. Jonathan Lurie, Reflections on Justice Samuel F. Miller & the 
Slaughter-House Cases: Still a Meaty Subject, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 355, 
359–60 (2005) [hereinafter Lurie, Reflections on Justice Miller]. 
 
 
                                                                                                             
2013] ANYTHING BUT COMMON 197 
 
reconstruction South.70 Campbell’s ire eventually led him into the 
ironic position of arguing that federal law, in the form of a 
Constitutional Amendment passed for the benefit of blacks and 
former slaves, precluded the legislature of the State of Louisiana 
from enacting certain laws.71 Chief Justice Miller, author of the 
Slaughterhouse decision, had joined the Court the year after 
Campbell’s resignation. In his correspondence, Miller had initially 
offered faint praise in support of Campbell.72 He had apparently 
changed his opinion of the man when he wrote of Campbell: “I 
have neither seen nor heard of any action of Judge Campbell’s 
since the rebellion . . . which was aimed at healing the breach he 
contributed so much to make.”73 In addition, there was significant 
concern that the argument forwarded by Campbell would dilute the 
protections granted to the freed-men under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.74 Miller’s skepticism grew in part from the very real 
debates concerning federalism.75 It was into this environment of 
 70. Id. at 360–61 (recounting Campbell’s path from the Supreme Court, to 
Assistant Secretary of the War for the Confederacy, to prison and ultimately to 
New Orleans, as well as describing Campbell as bitter at the state corruption and 
racial integration in the South). 
 71. Id. at 361 (“Here the ex-Confederate official who had glorified states' 
rights now repudiated the idea ‘that the Legislatures of the States have powers ... 
limited only by the express prohibitions of the [state and federal constitutions], 
or by necessary implication’”) (citing LABBÉ & LURIE, supra note 45) (alteration 
in original). 
 72. LABBÉ & LURIE, supra note 45, at 108–09. (“I esteem him very highly 
and look upon him as a man of honor and an unfortunate one”) (citing CHARLES 
FAIRMAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER & THE SUPREME COURT 1862-1890 at 113 
(Harvard Univ. Press 1939). 
 73. Id. (calling Campbell a partisan and a leader of “the worst branch” of 
New Orleans politics). 
 74. Lurie, Reflections on Justice Miller, supra note 69, at 367. 
 75. See e.g., James W. Fox Jr., Re-Readings & Misreadings: Slaughter-
House, Privileges or Immunities, and Section Five Enforcement Powers, 91 KY. 
L.J. 67, 86 (2002/2003): 
For Miller, the only option other than his restrictive view of the Clause 
was one that destroyed federalism and dangerously empowered the 
Court. The very starkness of the alternatives, argued Miller, enabled 
him to accept what he considered an otherwise weak (‘not always the 
most conclusive’) argument: the parade of anti-federalism horribles. He 
saw no middle ground. 
(quoting Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 78 (1872)). 
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war, graft, and personal strife that Campbell brought his arguments 
on behalf of the butchers. 
B. The Arguments Advanced 
1. By the Company 
The Company maintained its simple yet effective argument at 
each level of appeal. First, they argued that the butcher’s assertion 
that the legislature was bribed was unsupported by evidence.76 The 
Company and the State maintained that the Act was a fair and legal 
application of the State’s police power over the area of public 
health.77 Lastly, these defendants also argued that the Privileges 
and Immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was intended 
to extend only to the protection of rights received as the result of 
national citizenship, such as voting, habeas corpus, and other 
rights explicitly spelled-out in the Constitution.78 This simple yet 
effective three part argument, while ultimately successful, finds 
little support in Louisiana’s civilian jurisprudence. The continental 
understanding of the term “privileges and immunities” may even 
be couched in the Twelve Tables and its abolition of the 
 76. Transcript of Record at 18–19, Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872) 
(No. 466), 1870 WL 12597 (“That the allegations of said petition are 
impertenent (sic), scandalous, & criminous (sic); that it contains general, loose, 
& railing accusations against these defendants, without certainty, specification, 
or detail . . . .”). 
 77. Brief of Counsel of Defendant in Error at 6–7, Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 
U.S. 36 (1872) (No. 479), 1871 WL 14608: 
In order to promote the health and comfort of the people, the State of 
Louisiana possesses all the power of sovereignty; the legislature might 
direct State officers to be appointed to inspect and superintend stock 
landings and slaughter-houses, as well as direct where such should be 
established. Laws of this character have been respected by Congress 
from the earliest period of the Government.  
 78. Brief of Counsel of Defendant in Error, supra note 77, at 5: 
This amendment seeks to protect two classes of individuals: First, 
citizens of the United States; second, all persons whatever, whether 
citizens or aliens. The first portion plainly refers to political privileges, 
and shields only such privileges and immunities as individuals may 
have in their peculiar character as citizens of the United States . . . . 
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privilegium and immunitas granted by royal edict.79 This 
understanding was known in French law, and was reflected in the 
fact that the civil code, as a system of private law, understood 
rights and privileges to belong in first instance to the people.80 The 
offense to that understanding is therefore two-fold: First, it is 
repugnant to the civilian jurist that the law would only protect 
those privileges granted by a sovereign, instead of those naturally 
belonging to the citizen as a matter of ius cogens. Second, that a 
private company consisting of seventeen private citizens, and not 
the government itself, would exercise privileges and recognize 
profits that rightfully belonged equally to the citizens of Louisiana. 
To this point, the state asserted that the right to engage in the 
profession of butchering was not infringed, but simply its place 
and manner was restricted.81 This ignores the fact that, properly 
read, the butchers’ argument was not simply that their physical 
labor rights were infringed, but that the very granting of the 
privilege of operating a slaughterhouse to the Company was a 
violation of the equality of men before the civil code.  
 
 
 79. See Eberhard P. Deutsch, Civil Liberties Under the Civil Law, 12 TUL. 
L. REV. 331 (1938) (arguing that the foundation for American civil liberties is 
found in the civilian traditions of French and Roman law). 
 80. Id. at 335: 
In Great Britain, in other words, privileges vested in the crown in the 
first instance, and the demand, never questioning the royal prerogative, 
sought simply a grant or concession. In France, however, the 
declaration was boldly made that rights and liberties belong in the first 
instance to the people; that privileges and immunities are attributes of 
citizenship, not of nobility. 
 81. Brief of Counsel of State of Louisiana, and of Crescent City Live Stock 
Landing & Slaughter House Co., Defendants in Error at 4, Slaughterhouse 
Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872) (Nos. 60, 61, 62), 1872 WL 15119: 
The owner of the animal passed by the health inspector may then 
slaughter it for the market; he may do this either with his own hands, or 
by those of his own servants. The act of the legislature does not compel 
the owner of the animal to employ any State agent or corporation 
servant to slaughter the animal. All the act does is to say where it must 
be slaughtered. 
 
 
                                                                                                             
200 JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES [Vol. 6 
 
2. By the Butchers 
John Campbell had argued initially in the lower courts that the 
Act should be rescinded on the basis of it having been secured 
through graft, and improperly passed for not having been signed by 
the governor within the required time period. These arguments, 
while important, have been discussed above to the necessary 
extent, and will be, perhaps unfairly, de-prioritized so that the 
focus may be on the arguments before the Supreme Court. In 
arguments regarded by all of his contemporaries as masterful, 
Campbell retained his arguments that the Act was the product of 
bribery, but he also shifted his focus to what he saw as a violation 
of the civil rights of the butchers; rights that, as it happened, were 
now protected by the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the United States Constitution. 
 In his oral arguments before the Supreme Court, Campbell 
invoked the Thirteenth Amendment and argued that the butchers 
were being compelled into specific performance on behalf of the 
company.82 He drew parallels between the newly-freed slaves, the 
butchers, and examples from French history. French history, he 
said, included “a number of instances of persons [whose servitude 
consisted of] their performance of ludicrous and debasing acts on 
particular days of the year for the entertainment of their masters.”83 
He posited that if “a legislature of a state were to pass a law that 
the emancipated slaves should appear before their masters, sing 
some of their native songs, or dance their country [sic] dances, it 
would at once be pronounced as a restoration of some remnant of 
their ancient servitude.”84 This illustration highlights a key 
distinction. In the civilian tradition, involuntary servitude had been 
abolished by the civil code, and the protections of the private law 
 82. Transcript of the Oral Argument at 3, Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 
(1872), reprinted in 6 LANDMARK BRIEFS & ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME 
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 733, 736 (Philip B. 
Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., Univ. Pubs. of America 1975).  
 83. Id. at 5. 
 84. Id.  
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were thought to extend to any unjustly compelled act, especially 
those required by an edict of the sovereign. Campbell sought to 
cement this notion in the Court’s understanding, when he argues 
that there are several forms of servitude that have little to do with 
any requirement of labor or production.85 He supports his 
argument that the prohibition of involuntary servitude should be 
applied broadly, with a direct appeal to civilian tradition, saying 
that, upon the abolition of the feudal system at the time of the 
French Revolution, such honorific acts intended to assert the 
superiority of the lords over the inferior vassals had been 
abolished.86 In this we see the clear parallel between an act 
imposed by an illegitimate feudal government, and an offense 
prescribed by an illegitimate corrupt legislature.  
To the civilian it was not simply a matter of being required to 
undertake butchering in some particular manner, but that he was 
being compelled to engage in an act, by a sovereign using 
tyrannical means, which caused the act to become involuntary 
servitude. Campbell urged the Court to consider that the civilian 
tradition of the idea of servitude sounds in property law.87 
According to Campbell, the very use of the term servitude carries 
with it an invitation to consider property rights in oneself and one’s 
 85. Id. at 6 (stating that the conditions of caste are a form of servitude; 
describing the servitude inherent in the Hindu caste system). 
 86. Id. at 15 (quoting Phillippe-Antoine Merlin de Douai). 
 87. Plaintiffs Brief upon the Re-argument, supra note 59, at 4–5: 
What was involuntary servitude? The servitude (servitus) of the Roman 
law, and the continental law founded on it are relations of property. A 
right of one [sic], to deal with [sic], or to use the property of another, as 
an incident or accessory to his ownership of another property is a 
servitude. In strictness, the relations are those of immoveable property. 
The estate owing the servitude is Servient. The estate benefitted and the 
creditor is Dominant. When slaves become immoveable [sic], by 
destination and bound to the soil (coloni, adscriptitii) the servitude lost 
something of its strict character, and acts and duties were imposed upon 
the estate. Tythes are spoken of [sic], as a servitude combined with an 
obligation. There was a right to a part of the produce adversus 
quemcunque [sic], with a charge on the owner to set it apart, so in 
Scotland the teind. So the Thirlage which is classed as a servitude, and 
imposes the specific duty upon the inhabitant of the thirl to carry his 
grain to the mill to be ground.  
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labors. These were, he argued, liberties protected by the 
Constitution. In so doing, Campbell engages in an argument 
similar to that argued years later by Kojève.88 Campbell argued 
that the butcher, bound to the soil of the Company, was no longer 
free as a result of the violation of his privileges of citizenship. 
Kojève would argue that the unequal status with respect to rights in 
labor denied the butcher his humanity. 
 The butchers’ position was that the Fourteenth Amendment 
barred any state from passing any law abridging any privilege or 
immunity of a citizen.89 They include in these privileges and 
immunities those protected by the civil code, including “life, 
liberty, property, or title of the plaintiffs to equal protection.”90 In 
his supplemental brief, Campbell, writing to the Court, points out 
that according to Turgot, privileges to rights of labor ran to every 
Frenchmen, and privileges to the contrary were abolished as far 
back as 1776.91 In the more expansive application of the 
Fourteenth Amendment urged by Campbell:  
The State is commanded neither to make nor to enforce any 
law that deprives, or even abridges, any citizen of his 
enjoy-joyment [sic] of his privileges or immunities. To 
limit him in the choice of a trade, to deprive him of a 
business he has pursued, and to give to others the sole and 
exclusive right to follow that trade or to prosecute that 
business, violates this Constitution.92  
Throughout this brief there is the suggestion that the 
“enslaving” act of the Louisiana legislature was not just an affront 
 88. See supra Part II.A. 
 89. Supplemental Brief and Points of Plaintiffs in Error, supra note 63, at 2: 
The Constitution of the United States speaks to the State in the 
imperative. The State shall not make or enforce a law, nor pass a law, 
that shall work evil to any in the manner and in the particulars set 
forth…. The Government of the United States necessarily acquires a 
dominion over the State corresponding to the duty it has to perform. 
 90. Id. at 3. 
 91. Id. at 4 (“Therefore, every person was authorized to exercise his art, 
trade, or profession; and the privileges of corporations, guilds, and trading 
companies, to the contrary, were abolished”). 
 92. Id. 
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to the Constitution, but to the centuries of civil law jurisprudence 
that had come together to protect the equality of men through an 
individually applicable code of private law.93 Campbell even goes 
so far as to cite the Recueil Dalloz, a French law review in 
circulation at the time, for specific regulations pertaining to the 
slaughter of livestock.94 He argues that these regulations, unlike 
the Act, accomplish the appropriate health protections without 
creating a monopoly and without infringing on the right of men to 
employ their services as a butcher.95  
Campbell goes on to cast the meaning of privileges and 
immunities as growing from the Roman tradition, as discussed 
above.96 He argues that in Louisiana’s cession to the United States, 
Louisianans were guaranteed the privileges and immunities 
inherently belonging to the citizens of the United States. These, he 
argued, are civil, not merely political rights.97 To Campbell, and 
therefore to the butchers, the Fourteenth Amendment was intended 
to secure in every citizen all natural rights implied by the history of 
the civilian conception of liberty. Campbell’s argument was, in 
essence, an appeal to the ius cogens of the era. His reliance on the 
civilian basis of privileges and immunities may be best understood 
 93. See id.: 
The emancipating edict of Turgot, and the enslaving act of the 
Louisiana Legislature, in different ways, manifest the aim of the 
amendment to the Constitution. The spirit of the edict pervades the 
amendment, and it was framed to suppress all institutions of the kind. 
The Louisiana statute creates a corporation having all the odious 
features of those suppressed by the edict. 
 94. Id. at 4–5. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 6–7 (describing the genesis of the term “privileges and 
immunities” as a Roman reference to benefits or exemptions, and asserting that 
this remained the correct interpretation). 
 97. Id. at 7: 
The terms are found in the fourth of the Articles of Confederation, and 
the second section of the fourth article of the Constitution of the United 
States; and evidently apply not to political, but civil rights. These rights 
are protection to life, personal freedom, property, religion, reputation; 
and, in the Treaty of Paris of 1803, providing for the cession of 
Louisiana, the United States promise to grant the natives of that 
territory the rights, advantages and immunities of citizens. 
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as an attempt to point out that the peremptory norms in operation at 
the time of the formation of the Fourteenth Amendment would 
have presumed those liberties recognized by the continental 
approach; namely, the liberty of labor, property, and self-direction.  
C. The Decisions 
1. The Majority Opinion 
Unfortunately for Campbell, he was not arguing in a French 
court, and Justice Miller’s opinion reflected this in no uncertain 
terms. The opinion holds that the Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
Amendments were intended to secure the rights and freedoms of 
newly-freed slaves.98 Miller’s opinion, as any first year law student 
will attest, quickly and assuredly limits the application of the 
privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
granting the newly freed slave the right of citizenship and those 
other rights explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.99 Central to 
this limitation is Miller’s contention that the privileges and 
immunities of the United States are distinguishable from those 
granted by operation of state citizenship. To Miller, the Fourteenth 
Amendment protects only the former, and not the latter.100 It is 
 98. Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 71-72 (1872): 
We repeat, then, in the light of this recapitulation of events, almost too 
recent to be called history, but which are familiar to us all; and on the 
most casual examination of the language of these amendments, no one 
can fail to be impressed with the one pervading purpose found in them 
all, lying at the foundation of each, and without which none of them 
would have been even suggested; we mean the freedom of the slave 
race, the security and firm establishment of that freedom, and the 
protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from the oppressions 
of those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him. It is 
true that only the fifteenth amendment, in terms, mentions the negro by 
speaking of his color and his slavery. But it is just as true that each of 
the other articles was addressed to the grievances of that race, and 
designed to remedy them as the fifteenth. 
 99. Id.  
 100. Id. at 75: 
If, then, there is a difference between the privileges and immunities 
belonging to a citizen of the United States as such, and those belonging 
to the citizen of the State as such the latter must rest for their security 
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unnecessary to undertake a full criticism of the opinion of the 
majority in this case. Such criticism is nearly universal, and was at 
the time as well.101 What is more important is to discern what the 
effect of that criticism has been on subsequent civil rights 
jurisprudence. This paper adopts and aims to support that body of 
scholarship which suggests that the rejection of the majority 
opinion invited subsequent courts to adhere to the reasoning of the 
dissenting opinions by Justices Field and Bradley.102 
2. The Dissenting Opinions 
Three of the four Justices in the minority wrote dissenting 
opinions. Justices Field, Bradley, and Swayne each adopted and 
added upon the dissents of the other. Space is given here to the 
dissents of Justices Field and Bradley, while the dissent of Justice 
Swayne is respectfully omitted.103 
a. Justice Field’s Dissenting Opinion 
Justice Field’s dissent is notable in that it adopts a great deal of 
the arguments forwarded by Campbell. To Field, the question at 
hand was nothing less than whether the Fourteenth Amendment 
protected the citizens of the several states from state legislation 
and protection where they have heretofore rested; for they are not 
embraced by this paragraph of the amendment. 
 101. David S. Bogen, Slaughter-House Five: Views on the Case, 55 
HASTINGS L.J. 333, 336 (2003) (stating that distaste for the opinion is shared by 
a range of jurists, including Justice Clarence Thomas and Professor Lawrence 
Tribe).  
 102. See, e.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 54, at 1292 (crediting Justice Field’s 
dissent in the Slaughterhouse Cases as championing the view that developed 
into substantive due process); see also Wendy Parmet, From Slaughter-House to 
Lochner: The Rise and Fall of the Constitutionalization of Public Health, 40 
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 476, 481 (1996) (calling the majority opinion in the 
Slaughterhouse Cases a “trivialization” of the privileges and immunities clause, 
and crediting the dissent with “enunciating” the theory of substantive due 
process).  
 103. While all three dissents should be read together, only the first two are 
directly relevant to the purpose at hand. 
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that curtailed their rights.104 While Field was not willing to apply 
the Thirteenth Amendment as broadly as the butchers had hoped, 
he adopted and indeed embellished the argument that privileges 
and immunities extended to those rights seen as innate.105 Justice 
Field began his dissent by agreeing that the state police power does 
indisputably extend to regulations of health and safety.106 
According to Field however, there were only two provisions of the 
Act that pertained to an exercise of police power.107 Under his 
reading, only the pronouncements that the animals be inspected 
and that the slaughtering must occur below the City of New 
Orleans were proper exercises of police power.108 What is notable 
about Justice Field’s dissent is his extensive reliance, not just upon 
case law, but on the history of the common law of England, and on 
the civil law of France. Engaging in a sort of comparativism, 
Justice Field argues that monopolies of the sort granted in the Act 
were long held to be repugnant to the rights and privileges of a 
citizen.109 In a lengthy discussion of the English Case of 
Monopolies that arose during the rule of Queen Elizabeth I, Field 
asserts that the courts of England would have invalidated the Act 
as being “void at common law as destroying the freedom of 
 104. Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 91 (1872) (Field, J., dissenting). 
 105. Id.  
 106. Id. at 87 (“That power undoubtedly extends to all regulations affecting 
the health, good order, morals, peace, and safety of society, and is exercised on a 
great variety of subjects, and in almost numberless ways”). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 87–88: 
The health of the city might require the removal from its limits and 
suburbs of all buildings for keeping and slaughtering cattle, but no such 
object could possibly justify legislation removing such buildings from a 
large part of the State for the benefit of a single corporation. The 
pretense of sanitary regulations for the grant of the exclusive privileges 
is a shallow one, which merits only this passing notice. 
 109. See id. at 104: 
The common law of England, as is thus seen, condemned all 
monopolies in any known trade or manufacture, and declared void all 
grants of special privileges whereby others could be deprived of any 
liberty which they previously had, or be hindered in their lawful trade. 
The statute of James I, to which I have referred, only embodied the law 
as it had been previously declared by the courts of England, although 
frequently disregarded by the sovereigns of that country.  
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trade….”110 Field points out that the rights in question were seen as 
fundamental, inalienable rights under both the common law and 
civil law.111 According to Field, the Fourteenth Amendment was 
intended to give operation to those inalienable rights recognized by 
the Constitution, but in fact conferred by “the Creator.”112 What 
should be immediately apparent is that Field’s analysis did not 
only adopt the civilian view of economic rights and privileges; he 
argued that those rights were properly understood to be a 
peremptory norm in the English and French legal systems, and 
were therefore part of the ius cogens informing the creation of the 
American common law.113 
b. Justice Bradley’s Dissenting Opinion 
Justice Bradley not only adopts the dissent of Justice Field, but 
writes to dissent separately, saying that the rights in question are 
among the most inherent, fundamental rights protected by the 
Constitution.114 In making this argument, Justice Bradley engages 
in an analysis that looks a great deal like an early iteration of what 
will become substantive due process analysis. He argues that 
preservation of the rights to labor, property and self-determination 
are so fundamental that they are necessary to the operation of the 
liberty protected by the Constitution.115 That analysis asks the 
 110. Id. at 102. 
 111. Id. at 105. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 106: 
So fundamental has this privilege of every citizen to be free from 
disparaging and unequal enactments, in the pursuit of the ordinary 
avocations of life, been regarded, that few instances have arisen where 
the principle has been so far violated as to call for the interposition of 
the courts. But whenever this has occurred, with the exception of the 
present cases from Louisiana, which are the most barefaced and 
flagrant of all, the enactment interfering with the privilege of the citizen 
has been pronounced illegal and void. 
 114. Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. at 112–14 (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
 115. Id. at 116: 
Rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are equivalent to the 
rights of life, liberty, and property. These are the fundamental rights 
which can only be taken away by due process of law, and which can 
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reader to understand that without the power to exercise dominion 
over one’s own labor, one cannot be free.116 This sounds like 
nothing if not the argument, advanced by Campbell, that where one 
man or company has been granted a privilege, to the detriment of 
another, the party who holds the privilege becomes dominant, 
resulting in the servient party’s inability to exercise their own 
freedom. According to Campbell, and now to Justices Bradley and 
Field, this was repugnant to the idea of equality before the civil 
code, and also to the Constitution of the United States.117 Notably, 
both Justice Field’s and Justice Bradley’s dissents display a 
marked sense of incredulity. The reader notices a sense of either 
shock or surprise, as well as a modicum of indignation, that such 
foundational concepts are being challenged. Put another way, the 
dissents evince an understanding of the law that sees individual 
rights to labor as being indistinguishable from any other 
fundamental individual rights. They view these rights as 
peremptory norms, fundamentally presumed in the laws of the day. 
The depth of this belief stands out in greater relief upon reading 
Justice Bradley’s opinion below. In his opinion, Justice Bradley 
regards the Act as being antithetical to a republican form of 
only be interfered with, or the enjoyment of which can only be 
modified, by lawful regulations necessary or proper for the mutual 
good of all; and these rights, I contend, belong to the citizens of every 
free government. 
 116. Id.: 
For the preservation, exercise, and enjoyment of these rights the 
individual citizen, as a necessity, must be left free to adopt such calling, 
profession, or trade as may seem to him most conducive to that end. 
Without this right he cannot be a freeman. This right to choose one’s 
calling is an essential part of that liberty which it is the object of 
government to protect; and a calling, when chosen, is a man's property 
and right. Liberty and property are not protected where these rights are 
arbitrarily assailed. 
 117. See id. at 119 (Bradley, J., writing that the right to follow the profession 
of one’s choosing is the most fundamental of the privileges and immunities); see 
also, Plaintiff’s Brief Upon Re-argument, supra note 59, at 1,10, 49 (calling 
liberty of profession, including that of boucherie, a fundamental principle of 
law). 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 
2013] ANYTHING BUT COMMON 209 
 
government.118 These dissents, as well as the opinion below, 
display an adoption of the civilian sense of equality and economic 
liberty, as reflected in the ius cogens and ius commune. They 
supplement that understanding with support from natural law 
theory, and find that both systems require respect for economic 
liberty as being necessary for the law to operate in fidelity with fair 
and democratic governance. 
IV. ALLGEYER, LOCHNER, AND THE DISTINCTLY CIVILIAN FLAVOR 
OF ECONOMIC LIBERTY AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 
If the majority opinion in the Slaughterhouse Cases gave a 
coup de grâce to the privileges and immunities clause, the dissents 
articulated a clear path for the legion of jurists who would have 
decided the case differently. That path led plaintiffs seeking to 
vindicate their economic rights to assert them under the Due 
Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.119 This in turn led to 
the almost immediate development of substantive due process 
jurisprudence.120 The opinion in Allgeyer is dually notable: first 
 118. Live-Stock Dealers’ and Butchers’ Ass’n. v. Crescent City Live-Stock 
Landing & Slaughter-House Co., 15 F.Cas. 649, 652 (C.C.D. La. 1870) rev’d 
sub nom., Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872): 
These privileges cannot be invaded without sapping the very 
foundations of republican government [a republican government is a 
free government]. Without being free, it is republican only in name, 
and not republican in truth, and any government which deprives its 
citizens of the right to engage in any lawful pursuit, subject only to 
reasonable restrictions . . . is tyrannical and unrepublican. And if to 
enforce arbitrary restrictions made for the benefit of a favored few, it 
takes away and destroys the citizen’s property without trial or 
condemnation, it is guilty of violating all the fundamental privileges to 
which I have referred, and one of the fundamental principles of free 
government. There is no more sacred right of citizenship than the right 
to pursue unmolested a lawful employment in a lawful manner. It is 
nothing more nor less than the sacred right of labor.  
 119. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 123 (1876) (applying the Due Process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to regulations promulgated by the State of 
Illinois, and upholding those regulations as constitutional).  
 120. See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589–90 (1897) (citing Justice 
Bradley’s concurring opinion in Butchers’ Union Slaughter-House & Live-Stock 
Landing Co., v. Crescent City Live-Stock & Slaughter-House Co., 111 U.S. 746, 
for the proposition that liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment is meant to 
include economic liberty). 
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because it is authored by Justice Peckham, who would go on to 
write the controversial Lochner opinion, and second, because it 
adopts Justice Bradley’s civil law inflected privileges and 
immunities analysis from the Slaughterhouse Cases and applies 
them to the due process clause instead. This judicial sleight of hand 
is responsible for what would come to be known as “liberty of 
contract.”121 Justice Peckham’s reliance on Justice Bradley’s 
description of economic liberty is deft in citing to the more recent 
case as good law, while relying on the concurring opinion which 
had essentially recapitulated the dissent from the original 
Slaughterhouse Cases. Lochner, in turn, cites Allgeyer for the 
proposition that “[t]he general right to make a contract in relation 
to his business is part of the liberty of the individual protected by 
the 14th Amendment of the Federal Constitution.”122  
 This broader understanding of the scope of rights protected by 
the Fourteenth Amendment has its basis in the arguments 
submitted to the Court by John Campbell. His analysis of the scope 
of the Fourteenth Amendment protections grew from his 
knowledge of the civilian tradition, and was adopted by Justice 
Bradley. Bradley’s re-affirmation had in turn allowed Justice 
Peckham to author an opinion that, while based in the same 
jurisprudential tradition, accomplished those aims by way of the 
Due Process clause, all while avoiding the fatally hobbled 
privileges and immunities clause. Peckham’s decisions in Allgeyer 
and Lochner are responsible for injecting the civil law and its 
approach to private law into American constitutional law. It seems 
at least worth mentioning that much of the subsequent debate over 
Lochner and laissez faire economic jurisprudence stems in part 
from the application of this distinct portion of the civilian private 
law, absent the context that served as a limiting principle to the 
 121. BERNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 41 (calling Allgeyer the first case to invoke 
liberty of contract while invalidating a state law for violating the Due Process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 122. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905). 
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economic interests of the individual. Seen in this light, there seems 
to be support for plaudits and the criticisms leveled against the 
Lochner decision, and those that followed it during the so-called 
Lochner era. Justice Peckham’s approach in Lochner vindicated 
the full throated defense of the civil code offered by John 
Campbell and recognized that the liberties protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment were the full range of rights represented in 
the ius cogens.  
However well supported the Lochner decision was, it arose in a 
system vastly different than the one the butchers belonged to. In 
the absence of a unifying civil code, the opinion served to 
exacerbate inequalities laid bare by the growth of corporate 
interests in a newly industrialized economy. Where the Louisiana 
Civil Code had served to equalize dealings between individuals 
given equal standing through other parts of the code, Lochnerian 
jurisprudence would lack an equivalent leash until at least 1937.123  
The use of the Due Process clause to protect economic rights 
had begun its decline with the decisions in West Coast Hotel, and 
Carolene Products.124 Perhaps fearing that laws protecting 
individual and civil rights would become vulnerable as a result of 
their decision, the Court in Carolene included the much discussed 
“Footnote Four” which bifurcated the standards of review for 
economic regulations from the more stringent review that is 
undertaken when a regulation may be an infringement on rights.125 
 123. See West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937); see also 
United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (both cases upheld 
regulatory limitations on liberty of contract as permissible under the Due 
Process clause, in order to protect public health and welfare). 
 124. Id. 
 125. See, e.g., Helen Garfield, Privacy, Abortion, & Judicial Review, 61 
WASH. L. REV. 293, 301 (1986): 
Having clothed economic legislation with so strong a presumption of 
constitutionality, Justice Stone recognized that he might be diluting the 
constitutional protection afforded individual rights. In the now-famous 
footnote four, he conceded that ‘[t]here may be narrower scope for 
operation of the presumption of constitutionality’ when legislation (1) 
‘appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the 
Constitution,’ or (2) ‘restricts those political processes which can 
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That footnote helped to ensure that the substantive due process 
analysis that Campbell and the Slaughterhouse butchers helped 
elucidate would continue to be brought to bear on cases relating to 
individual rights. With the exceptionally consequential decision in 
Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court laid out its now controversial 
“penumbral” understanding of the rights ensured by the 
Constitution.126 This expansive understanding of individual rights 
was central to the laudable decisions in Roe v. Wade127 and 
Lawrence v. Texas,128 all but guaranteeing that substantive due 
process will continue to feature heavily in the Court and in the 
culture wars. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Lochner has long been presumed dead, given the rise of the 
deferential rational basis review and the New Deal legislation that 
it permitted, but this does not mean that the civilian tradition that 
served as its incubator has been equally shunted aside. The rhetoric 
of Campbell, Bradley, and Peckham has become thoroughly 
enmeshed in any debate over the scope of governmental power. 
While the flood of cases governing the ebb and flow of economic 
due process have slowed, the past century has born witness to the 
renewed influence of the civilian tradition in the form of increased 
codification at the federal level, and with it, a new-found place for 
the doctrine of judicial restraint. The development of substantive 
due process remains central in the protection of individual civil 
ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation,’ 
or (3) discriminates against minorities, since ‘prejudice against discrete 
and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously 
to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be 
relied upon to protect minorities.’ Thus the Court's dual standard of 
review was born.  
 126. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (“[S]pecific 
guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from 
those guarantees that help give them life and substance. 
 127. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 128. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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rights.129 That such a formidable body of jurisprudence, on such 
important issues, is founded on ideas rooted in civilian legal 
thought is a testament to the salience of those ideas.  
The close relationship between substantive due process and the 
butchers’ arguments under the privileges and immunities clause 
continues to be relevant. The arguments advanced in support of 
substantive civil rights under the due process clause were just as 
comfortably made by John Campbell in support of economic rights 
under the privileges and immunities clause. Indeed, the operation 
of the Due Process clause and the Privileges and Immunities clause 
are now seen as effectively synonymous within the world of legal 
academia.130 The rulings in Lochner v. New York, Griswold v. 
Connecticut, Roe v. Wade and Lawrence v. Texas all rely on the 
doctrine of substantive due process, which in turn owes its 
existence to the civilian butchers and the ius commune and ius 
cogens as reflected in the Louisiana Civil Code. It is impossible to 
know how Campbell would feel about the current iteration of his 
argument. One might think that he would feel vindicated but 
perplexed. To a civilian scholar like Campbell, the distinction 
made in “Footnote Four”131 would seem tortured and unnecessary. 
Then again, maybe that distinction lends us the context necessary 
to employ civilian privileges and immunities analysis, absent the 
context of the ius commune. In either case, it is clear that 
substantive due process is an appeal to the peremptory norms of 
our time, and that the civil law tradition of Louisiana has played a 
significant role in informing how those norms, in the form of 
individual rights, are protected.  
 129. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482–83 (1965) 
(discussing the importance of penumbral rights protected by the Due Process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).  
 130. Kermit Roosevelt III, What if Slaughter-House Had Been Decided 
Differently?, 45 IND. L. REV. 61, 62–63 (describing the academic consensus that 
the Slaughter-House Cases were wrongly decided but that “overruling it would 
not change much about the current state of constitutional law”).  
 131. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152.  
 
 
                                                                                                             
